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STATUTORY COMMENTS
THE CONTROL OF POLLUTION BY OIL UNDER
THE WATER QUALITY IMPROVEMENT ACT OF
1970*
JAMES S. DIx AND ARON L. SUNA
Oil pollution is the almost inevitable consequence of the de-
pendence of a rapidly growing population on a largely oil-based
technology. The oil reserves which have accumulated in the
earth during the last 5o million years are being depleted rapid-
ly and will be exhausted within a few hundred years. The use of
oil or of other natural resources without losses is impossible;
losses occur in production, transportation, refining and use.1
I INTRODUG1rION
The worst oil spill in history occurred on March 19, 1967, when a
tanker, the Torrey Canyon, ran aground off the coast of England, re-
leasing go,oooooo gallons of crude oil into the ocean.2 Despite the best
efforts of the British government, the oil polluted 12o miles of the
English shoreline.8 This spill was characterized as a freak occurrence
because of the extreme negligence of the Torrey Canyon's captain. In
shipping circles, it was considered inconceivable that such an accident
would reoccur.4 It did not until March 3, 1968, when another oil
tanker, the Ocean Eagle, ran into a well-known shoal at the mouth of
San Juan harbor.5 Although the spillage involved in that incident was
only 3,ocoooo gallons,6 it should be noted that both the frequency
and gravity of such spills are likely to increase for two reasons: first,
*A student paper presented in conjunction with the course, Natural Resources
Seminar, School of Law, Washington and Lee University, Spring 197
o .
'Hearings on S. 7 and S. 544 Before the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution
of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, gist Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 91-2, pt. 4, at
1485 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings] quoting Max Blumer, senior
scientist at Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution-from material which he pre-
sented at a Symposium at Scripps Institution of Oceanography on February 24-25,
1969.
-Senate Hearings, pt. 3, at 817.
3NEwswEEK, Apr. lo, 1967, at 5i.
Cowan, Mankinds Fouled Nest-Oil on the Waters, NATION, Mar. io, ig6g,
304-07.
5Senate Hearings, pt. 2, at 429.
eActually, the spill was 71,4oo barrels. Senate Hearings, pt. 1, at 182. This
equal 3,oo8,800 gallons. See text accompanying note 52 infra.
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more oil is being handled yearly and second, new supertankers7
dwarf even the Torrey Canyon.S However, such spillage from vessels is
only one aspect of the oil pollution problem.
Another source of potential pollution, as dangerous as vessel spill-
age, is the proliferation of offshore drilling. In the United States this
practice is most prevalent both off the Gulf Coast and the coast of
California.9 The leasing of the submerged lands lying in the Santa
Barbara Channel proved to be a most lucrative source of income for
the Federal Government:
On February 6, 1968, the Federal Government received bids
totalling $6o million for 75 of the i 1o lease blocks offered.
. . . These blocks are 3 miles square and contain about 5700
acres. The highest bid was a combine of Gulf, Texaco, Mobil,
7It appears that the use of supertankers will increase
Experience with supertankers has shown that the direct cost of transport-
ing oil goes down as the size of the tanker increases, apparently without
limit; the limit on building larger tankers is the lack of suitable shore
facilities for them. As more deepwater loading and unloading facilities
are created, larger and larger tankers become economically feasible.
21 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA TANKm, at 666 (1969).
"Deadweight tonnage (d.w.t.) is the weight which a vessel is designed to carry
safely. The Torrey Canyon was approximately ilo,ooo d.w.t. See Senate Hearings,
pt. 4, at 93o. For indications that within a few years, tankers of 5oo,oo0 d.w.t. will
be plying the seas, see SCIENCE, Apr. 12, 1968, at 167-69.
The following list indicates some of the larger oil tankers in operation as of
June. 1969: d.w.t, 
d.w.t.
Universe Kuwait, Lib ........ 326,500 Yowa Maru, Jap ............. 209,300
Universe Ireland, Lib ........ 326,500 Melania, Br ................. 209,000
Universe Iran, Lib ........... 326,500 Murex, Br ................... 208,800
Universe Japan, Lib .......... 326,500 Arabiyah, Kuw .............. 208,560
Universe Korea, Lib .......... 326,500 Medora, Br .................. 207,332
Universe Portugal, Lib ....... 326,500 Evgenia Chandris, Br ......... 207,000
Esso Cambria, Br ............ 255,000 Marisa, Br .................. 206,937
Esso Northumbria, Br ........ 255,000 Meta, Br .................... 2o6,913
Esso Scotia, Br ............... 255,000 Megara, Br .................. 2o6,750
Caterina M, It ............... 227,000 Mangelia, Br ................ 206,525World Chief, Lib...........219,259 Macoma, Neth ............... 206,679
Energy Evolution, Lib ........ 213,700 Metula, Neth ................ 2o6,670
Olympic Armour, Lib ........ 213,000 Idemitsu Maru, Jap .......... 2o6,1o6
Energy Transport, Lib ....... 212,000 Mactra, Br .................. 205,000
John A. McCone, Lib ........ 212,000 Dirch Maersk, Den ........... 205,000
Magdala, Fr ................. 212,000 Dorthe Maersk, Den .......... 2o5,ooo
Bulford, Br .................. 210,822 Shoju Maru, Jap ............. 202,400
Japan Canna, Jap ............ 210,000 Berge Commander, Nor ...... 202,942
Mytilus, Br .................. 21,ooo Bergehus, Nor ............... 202,557
WORLD ALmANAC-197o at 116 (1969).
OAs of January 31, 1969 there were over iooo oil and gas well completions
on outer continental shelf lands. Hearings on H.R. 4r48 and Related Bills Before
the House Comm. on Public Works, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 91-1 at 361 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as House Hearings].
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and Union Oil Cos., on parcel 402, for which $61.4 million was
paid.o
On January 28, 1969, there was a "blowout" of well no. 5 on
Union Oil Company's Platform A-21 in the Santa Barbara Channel.
While estimates of the spillage varied from 5o0 to 2o,ooo barrels a
day,:1 within a week the spill covered an area of 400 square miles and
polluted ten miles of Santa Barbara's beaches. 12 The government and
Union Oil made a concerted effort to contain the oil by the use of
booms but did not make the mistake of using chemical dispersants as
was done in the Torrey Canyon disaster.'3 Once the oil washed ashore,
bulldozers, hay and rakes were used to clean the beaches, highlighting
the surprising lack of technological expertise in dealing with prob-
lems of oil removal. 14 It was this failure of technology which caused
the final financial losses to far exceed the value of the oil spilled.15
"Senate Hearings, pt. 2, at 272.
"Senate Hearings, pt. 2, at 351 quoting Fred Hartley, President of Union Oil
Co. President Hartley testified: "I think the numbers that we have indicated of
between not less than ioo barrels a day and not more than 5oo is a pretty fair
range....H" Fowever, while this was Union Oil's estimate, he acknowledged that
some experts estimated the flow to be in the neighborhood of 2o,ooo barrels a day.
Senate Hearings, pt. 2, at 351.
"Senate Hearings, pt. 2, at 288-89.
"In Status Report-Use of Chemicals and Other Materials to Treat Oil on
Water, a paper prepared by the Federal Water Pollution Control Administration,
it was stated:
[Dispersants] first major test came during the Torrey Canyon incident
where 5,ooo tons of dispersants [at a cost of over $f,ooo,ooo] were used to
treat 75,o0 tons of oil. Two thirds of this amount was used for cleaning
oil from contaminated shores and resulted in severe adverse effects on the
aquatic life. The areas of the shore where the dispersants were not used,
but heavily polluted with oil alone, showed very minor damage .... These
observations led to the conclusion that dispersants cause much more
damage to aquatic life than oil alone.
Moreover, the combination of oil and dispersant may conceivably increase
the toxicity of either the oil, the dispersant chemical, or both .... The pos-
sibility of this "synergistic" action must be carefully examined before whole-
sale and wide-spread use of dispersants is permitted. Dispersing the oil
(which is toxic) may also compound the damage.
Senate Hearings, Pt. 4, at 1017-18 (emphasis added).
""Inmates from state conservation camps spread straw, talc and pearlite
along the beaches to soak up the oil. Farm mulchers on barges spewed hay into
the harbor and men in small wooden punts followed pulling in the oil-laden straw
with garden rakes." This rather graphic description appeared in NEwsWEEK, Feb.
17, 1969, at 32.
"See generally Hardin, Finding Lemonade In Santa Barbara's Oil, SATMURAY
REviEW, May io, 1969, at 21 where the author stated: "It should be noted that
to date the lawsuits resulting from the spill total more than $2 billion. For a
yardstick, the value of the oil lost in the first twelve days of spillage was less than
$1 million."
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The Water Quality Improvement Act of 197016 (hereinafter referred
to as the 197o Act) is an attempt to police and alleviate oil pollution
by enabling the government automatically to recover cleanup costs
from the polluter. In analyzing the 197 o Act, it is necessary to deline-
ate the scope, relate the legislative history, and hypothesize as to the
application of the liability provisions of section ii of that Act.
With certain exceptions,' 7 the scope of the 197o Act includes regu-
lation of all on-and offshore oil facilities within a state's jurisdic-
tion.I8 The same facilities in Federal waters are governed by regula-
tions issued by the Secretary of the Interior and do not come within
"Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224 (Apr. 3, 1970)
[hereinafter cited as i97o Act].
Other aspects of the i97o Act, which will not be considered, are: the civil
and criminal sanctions imposed (§§ ii(b)(4)-(5)); the National Contingency Plan
to be established for the removal of oil (§§ ri(c)(2)(A)-(G)); the establishment of
regulations to prevent, inter alia, the occurence of discharges by imposing more
stringent procedures, methods, and requirements with regard to equipment and
its use and by governing the inspection of oil-carrying vessels (§ ii(j)(1)); the re-
volving fund of $35,ooo,ooo established in the Treasury to carry out the provisions
of this section (§ ii(k)); the provisions investing appropriate district courts with
jurisdiction as to all actions (§ is(n)), except those actions which must be brought
in the United States Court of Claims (§ il(i)(x)); the establishment of compulsory
vessel insurance, to go into effect one year from the date of this Section (April
3, 197o), to meet any liability to the United States which might result (§§ ll(p)(1)-
(2)).
It should also be pointed out that no attempt is made to deal with the
problem of the insurability of the various limits of liability. The concern is
whether the limits are adequate; i.e., whether they are sufficient to reimburse
the United States for costs incurred in cleaning up pollution by oil. However,
the spectre of liability insurance lurks in the background and is a pervasive
influence in any implementation of adequate limits.
17197o Act §§ 11(f)(2)-(3).
18H.R. REP. No. 91-940, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1970) states:
The definition of "onshore facility" means any facility (including motor
vehicles and rolling stock) of any kind located in, on, or under any land
within the United States other than submerged land. Thus, it is made
clear that tank trucks and railroad tank cars are included in the definition
as well as all other facilities such as storage tanks or refineries from
which oil could be discharged into the waters in question. The definition
would not include, however, facilities which are built upon any submerged
lands in the United States.
The definition of "offshore facility" means any facility of any kind
located in, on, or under any of the navigable waters of the United States
other than a vessel or public vessel. This would include offshore drilling
rigs as well as all other offshore facilities within the navigable waters of
the United States which, in the case of the coastal waters would extend to
the seaward boundaries of the States within the meaning of the Submerged
Lands Act.
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the 197o' Act.19 With identical exceptions,20 polluting vessels in waters
under a state's jurisdiction are within the scope of the act2' and
vessels which are in waters outside of a state's jurisdiction, but inside
the contiguous zone may fall within the act if oil discharges "threaten
the fishery resources of the contiguous zone or threaten to pollute or
contribute to the pollution of the territory or the territorial sea of the
United States.
' 22
On the other hand, the federal government has jurisdiction sea-
ward of the three-mile limit, pursuant to the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act.23 This act authorized the Secretary of the Interior to make
leases and, concomitantly to promulgate certain regulations to con-
trol the activities of the lessees.24 Prior to the Santa Barbara incident
(which occurred 5.5 miles off the California coast) the regulations read,
in part:
The lessee shall not pollute the waters of the high seas or dam-
age the aquatic life of the sea or allow extraneous matter to
enter and damage any mineral- or water- bearing formation.
The lessee shall dispose of all useless liquid products of wells in
a manner acceptable to the supervisor.25
However, a prohibition without a sanction made the regulation
ineffective. Consequently, as a result of the Santa Barbara blowout,
the above section was redesignated 250.43(e), and a new section (b)
was added, which provided as follows:
(b) If the waters of the sea are polluted by the drilling or pro-
duction operations conducted by or on behalf of the lessee, and
such pollution damages or threatens to damage aquatic life,
wildlife, or public or private property, the control and total
removal of the pollutant, wheresoever found, proximately re-
sulting therefrom shall be at the expense of the lessee. Upon
failure of the lessee to control and remove the pollutant the
supervisor, in cooperation with other appropriate agencies of
""The provisions of this subsection shall not apply in any case where
liability is established pursuant to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act."
197o Act § ii(i)(2). The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act provides that
"[t]he Secretary shall administer the provisions of this subchapter relating
to the leasing of the outer Continental Shelf, and shall prescribe such
rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out such provisions."
43 U.S.C. § 1834(a)(1) (Supp. IV, 1969).
M 197o Act § si(f)(i).
*'See 197o Act § xi(b)(i).
2197o Act § ii(b)(3).
23See Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (Supp. IV, I969).
24 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1334(a)(i) (Supp. IV, 1969).
!3o C.F.R. § 250.42 (Repl. Vol. 1969).
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the Federal, State and local governments, or in cooperation
with the lessee, or both, shall have the right to accomplish the
control and removal of the pollutant in accordance with any es-
tablished contingency plan for combating oil spills or by other
means at the cost of the lessee. Such action shall not relieve the
lessee of any responsibility as provided herein.
2 6
The Secretary of the Interior, Walter J. Hickel, stated that the pur-
pose of this regulation was to assure that:
the holder of a Federal lease on the Outer Continental Shelf
would be responsible without proof of fault for pollution result-
ing from their [sic] operations. Thus, the lessee must bear full
financial responsibility-absolute liability, with or without fault,
and unlimited responsibility for cleanup costs.2 7
Consequently, the federal government can impose absolute liability
on oil drilling outside the three mile limit pursuant to their leases.
However, there were no automatic reimbursement procedures open
when the government assumed the initiative in cleanup operations
within the three mile limit. The government's only course of action-
an unsatisfactory one at best-was recourse to litigation. Hence, there
was a need for legislation which would be effective within the three
mile limit.
Early legislation which dealt with oil pollution was the Oil Pollu-
tion Act of 1924.28 This act prohibited the discharge of oil from vessels
but contained the following exceptions: emergency imperiling life or
property, unavoidable accident, collision or stranding and other oc-
currences permitted by the regulations prescribed by the Secretary of
the Interior. Any person who violated the act was guilty of a mis-
demeanor and could be punished by a fine of from $5oo to $2500 or
by imprisonment of from thirty days to one year. The act of 1924 did
not envision offshore drilling, and even its provisions for vessels were
hopelessly inadequate, since it made no mention of liability for clean-
up costs resulting from spills.
Still not considering the possibility of oil pollution from offshore
drilling, Congress in 1966 amended the Oil Pollution Act of 1924,
making the owner or operator of a vessel liable to the United States
for any cleanup costs incurred by the latter. To enforce this, the
United States was given a lien against the offending vessel.2 9 However,
-34 Fed. Reg. 13547 (1969).
=House Hearings at 303-04 (Statement made by the Secretary of the Interior,
Walter J. Hickel, on Wednesday, Mar. 5, 1969) (emphasis added).
2Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 431-37 (1964), as amended, 3 U.S.C. §§ 431-37
(Supp. IV, 1969).
2Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. § 43 3 (b) (Supp. IV, 1969), amending 33 U.S.C.
§ 433 (1964).
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in amending the Act of 1924 to provide for recovery against the pollu-
ter, Congress included for the first time a definition of what would be
deemed to constitute a "discharge" of oil. The newly added section
provided that "'discharge' means any grossly negligent, or willful
spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, omitting, or emptying of oil
.... "30 Thus, to recover any cleanup costs, it was incumbent upon the
United States to prove that the polluter was either grossly negligent or
willful.
The Secretary of the Interior administers the Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act, as amended, through the Federal Water Pollution
Control Administration.8 1 Under section (5 )(b) of the Act, the Federal
Water Pollution Control Administration may participate in a pollu-
tion incident involving oil or other hazardous material and make
recommendations for the solution of the problem at the request of a
state or interstate water pollution control agency. Section (5)(b) states:
The Secretary may, upon request of any State water pollution
control agency, or interstate agency, conduct investigations and
research and surveys concerning any specific problem of water
pollution confronting any State, interstate agency, community,
municipality, or industrial plant, with a view of recommending
a solution of such problem.
8 2
However, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act did not deal
with serious oil spills. Thus, it can be said that through 1969 there
was no legislation which effectively dealt with the problem of reim-
bursing the United States Government for costs incurred in cleanup.
The only statute which purported to deal with this was the Oil Pollu-
tion Act of 1924, as amended, and it did so ineffectively.
Then, in 1969, responding to the Torrey Canyon, Ocean Eagle,
and Santa Barbara crises, Congress proposed various legislation. The
House introduced and passed H.R. 4148 while the Senate introduced
and passed S. 7 .33 These bills represented varying approaches to the
"COil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. § 432(3) (Supp. IV, 1969), amending 33 U.S.C.
§ 432 (1964) (emphasis added).
"Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 466 (Supp. IV, 1969),
amending 33 U.S.C. § 466 (1964). See also Exec. Order No. 11288, 33 U.S.C.A.
§ 466 (1966).
3Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 466c(a)(5)(b) (1964).
M-I.R. 4148, 91st Cong., ist Sess. (1969) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 4148]; S. 7,
91st Cong., ist Sess. (1969) [hereinafter cited as S. 7]. Actually the House passed
H.R. 4148 and then sent the bill to the Senate. The Senate substituted in toto
the language of S. 7 and this was the "H.R, 4148" which it passed.
Unless otherwise noted all references to S. 7 and H.R. 4148 are to those
bills as passed and not as introduced.
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problem of imposing liability on a polluter for cleanup costs. On
April 3, 1970, the President signed into law a compromise bill which
was designated the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970.34
II ScoPE OF LEGISLATION
Before any statutory liability can be imposed there is the threshold
determination of whether the act in question (here the oil discharge)
comes within the purview of the statute.
Certain discharges of oil do not come within the provisions of H.R.
4148. For instance, the bill would not apply if the discharge resulted
from an emergency imperiling life, an act of war or sabotage, or an
unavoidable accident, collision, or stranding.35 In addition, other
discharges might be specifically excepted by regulations to be pro-
mulgated by the Secretary of the Interior.36 Discharges into the con-
tiguous zone, where not prohibited by Article IV of the International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, were
also not to be within the scope of the bill.
37
S. 7 provided that all discharges were to be within the scope of the
bill with two exceptions:
(A) . . . discharges into the waters of the contiguous zone . .
(B) [discharges] where permitted in quantities and at times and
locations or under such circumstances or conditions as the Presi-
dent may, by regulation, deem appropriate.
38
The 197o Act provides that discharges in harmful quantities are within
the scope of the act, with the two virtually identical exceptions.3 9
III IMPOSITION OF LIABILITY FOR CLEANUP COSTS
Once it has been established that a discharge falls within the scope
of the act, it must be determined whether the particular discharge
falls within one of the possible exceptions to the imposition of liability
for the resultant cleanup costs. Table A summarizes these exceptions
and sets out limits of liability, designating the instances where un-
limited liability is applicable.
"Presidential Documents, vol. 6, no. 14, at 475 (April 6, 197o).
'H.R. 4148 § 17(c)(1).
"H.R. 448 § 17(c)(1).
H-.R. 4148 § 17(c)(1).
^S. 7 § 12(b)(1).
M197o Act § 11(b)(2).
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TABLE A
LIABILITY FOR CLEANUP COSTS
LIMITED
T __ I T TMPV
EXCEPTIONS LIMITS
'V, T .TA'ITT .T'V (' T .TA'ITT .T'PV
UNLIMITED










Willful or Not VESSELS: $450/
Negligent Discharge Applicable Gross Registered
Ton or $15, 000,
000, the lesser
FACILITIES: Up NONE
to $15, 000, 000
Willful or Not VESSELS: $100/
Negligent Discharge Applicable Gross Registered
Ton or $10, 000,
000, the lesser
FACILITIES: Up
to $8,000, 000 NONE
Willful or Not VESSELS: $450/
Negligent Discharge Applicable Registered Gross
Ton or $15, 000,
000, the lesser
FACILITIES: Up
to $15, 000, 000 NONE
Non-Negligent 1. Act of God, VESSELS: $125/
Discharge or Gross Ton or Negligence
2. Act of War, $14, 000,000, or
or the lesser Willful Act
3. Negligence
on the part FACILITIES: $125/
of the United Ton of Oil Handlid
States by Such Facility




to $8, 000, 000
Non-Negligent 1. Act of God, VESSELS: $1001
Discharge or Gross Ton or
2. Act of War, $14,000,000, Willful
or the lesser Negligence
3. Negligence on or
part of United FACILITIES: Willful
States, or a. Offshore: Misconduct
4. Negligent or Up to $8, 000,
Non-Negligent 000
Act or Omis- b. Onshore: Up
sion of Third to $ , 000,
Party, or Any O0
Combination
of the above
1. See note 33, supra.
2. See note 51, infra.
3. Lower limits may be set for onshore facilities with a total fixed storage
capacity of 1, 000 barrels or less.
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In a comparison of S. 7 and H.R. 4148, a factor of primary signi-
ficance is that both omit the requirement of the Oil Pollution Act of
1924, as amended, that the pollution be brought about through gross
negligence.4 0 While H.R. 4148 requires that vessel discharges be willful
or negligent, it provides that any discharge of oil constitutes a prima
fade case of liability, and that the burden of rebutting such a case
is on the offender.4 1 S. 7 imposes a form of absolute liability to specified
monetary limits, except where the discharge from a vessel is willful
or negligent, in which case there is no limitation.42 The House bill im-
poses limits of 5ioo per gross registered ton of the offending vessel or
$id,ooo,ooo whichever is lesser,43 while the Senate bill imposes a
higher limit of $125 per gross ton, not to exceed $14,ooo,ooo 4
With regard to onshore and offshore oil facilities, the House bill
provides that the discharge must be "willful or negligent"45 and pro-
vides, as in the case of vessels, that a discharge of oil constitutes a
prima fade case against the polluter.4 6 It also provides a limitation on
liability of $8,ooo,ooo.
4 7
IV CQuTicIs OF PROPOSED LEGISLArION
H.R. 4148 would have been inadequate for several reasons. It does
not appear to go far enough with regard to facilitating the imposition
of liability on polluters. The Oil Pollution Act of 1924, as amended,
required willful or gross negligence, and H.R. 4148 broadens the
standard only to the extent that it substitutes the requirement of
ordinary negligence for that of gross negligence. H.R. 4148 also creates
a prima facie case for the United States and places the burden of re-
butting such case on the polluter. In order for the United States to
collect for cleanup costs, it must adhere to the judicial process which
entails time-consuming, costly and complex litigation.
Under H.R. 4148, if the offending party can prove that the dis-
charge was neither willful nor negligent, then he is not liable. More-
over, if a willful or negligent discharge is proved, there is a limitation
imposed on recovery by the United States. Thus, even in the case of
LSee H.R. 4148 §§ 17(e)(1), (f)()-(2); S. 7 §§ 12(f)(), (i)(0-(2).
"H.R. 4148 § 17(e)(2).
'4S. 7 § 12((1).
'3H.R. 4148 § 17(e)(1).
"S. 7 § 12()(I).
'5H.R. 4148 §§ 17()(1)-(2).
"'H.R. 4148 § 17(e)(2).
'-H.R. 4148 § 17 (f)(8 ).
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the willful or negligent polluter, the United States may not be able
to recover the full costs incurred in cleaning up the oil spill. Finally,
the limitations of $io,oooooo for oil spills from vessels would seem to
be inadequate in light of the Torrey Canyon disaster.48
The Senate bill makes an unwieldy distinction between "facilities"
and "drilling-production facilities," imposing a different type of liabil-
ity for each. For "drilling-production facilities," S. 7 imposes absolute
liability (with certain exceptions) with a limitation on such liability
of $8,ooo,ooo except where the dscharge is willful or negligent, in
which case the polluter is liable without limitation.49 For "facilities,"
S. 7 imposes a limit of liability at the rate of $125 per ton of oil which
such facilities are capable of processing, transporting, or transferring,
in any twenty-four hour period, or storing in the largest stoage tank,
whichever is greater.5o However, the language of the provision would
seem to be susceptible to several interpretations which would cause
difficulty in any application of the section.51
"8See Senate Hearings, pt. 1, at 133; text accompanying note 83 infra.
'S. 7 § 12(i)(2).
50S. 7 § 12(i)(1).
5MS. 7 § 12(i)(1) provides:
MI]he owner or operator... shall be liable to the United States Govern-
ment for the actual cost incurred for the removal of such oil by the United
States Government in an amount not to exceed $125 per ton of oil which
facility is capable of (i) processing, (ii) transporting, (iii) transferring, in
any twenty-four hour period, or (iv) storing in the largest unit of such
facility, whichever is greater, except where the discharge was the result
of negligence or a willful act, the owner or operator shall be liable to the
United States Government for the full amount of the costs.
This provision would seem to be susceptible to several interpretations. The
problem arises from the fact that the disjunctive, "or," has been placed after a
series of three seemingly related functions, all of which are to occur within a
twenty-four hour period, and before a fourth unrelated function. The first interpre-
tation that can be made is that only the quantity of oil which has been (i) pro-
cessed, (2) transported and (3) transferred within one twenty-four hour period
(only the oil which has undergone all three within twenty-four hours) is to be
measured. This tonnage is then compared with the capacity of the largest storage
tank; the greater figure serves as the basis for calculating the owner's or operator's
liability. A second interpretation would measure all the oil which has been either
(i) processed, or (2) transported, or (3) transferred within one twenty-four hour
period (all the oil which has undergone any of the three within twenty-four hours).
This tonnage would then be compared with the capacity of the largest storage
tank in the same manner as in the first interpretation, taking the greater quantity
as the basis for determining the owner's or operator's liability. A third and prob-
ably the intended interpretation would take one twenty-four 'hour period and
measure the amount of oil which is (i) processed in that period, (2) transferred
in that period and (3) transported in that period. These three separate quantities
would then be compared with the fourth, the capacity of the largest storage tank.
[Vol. XXVII
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V. SIGNIFICANT DEFINITIONAL ADDITIONS AND
CHANGES OF ENACTED LEGISLATION
The 197o Act's definition of the word "barrel" is a valuable addi-
tion to previous legislation. "Barrel" is defined as "42 United States
gallons at 66 degrees Fahrenheit." 52 The importance of this definition
becomes readily apparent when measuring tons of oil, since the quant-
ity depends on the specific gravity and the particular temperature.53
While the 197o Act incorporates many of the definitions of S. 7,
it is interesting to note the specific adoption of a new definition of
"Act of God." S. 7 defined "Act of God" as "an act occasioned ex-
clusively by violence of nature without the interference of any
human agency."5 4 The 197o Act defines it as "an act occasioned by an
unanticipated grave natural disaster."5 5
The largest of these four quantities would form the basis for calculating the
owner's or operator's liability. If this third interpretation is, indeed, the correct
one, perhaps the provision could have been drafted with greater clarity by insert-
ing the phrase "in any twenty-four hour period" after "processing" and "trans-
porting."
One other point should be raised concerning this section. Assume that the
third interpretation is correct, and that, of the four quantities, the amount pro-
cessed is considerably greater than any of the other three, therefore serving as
the basis for calculating the owner's or operator's liability. S. 7 stipulates that
one must look to the amount processed "in any twenty-four hour period." It
would seem that the quantity of oil processed (and the same would be true of
the quantities of oil transferred and transported) would not remain constant but
would vary from one twenty-four hour period to the next. Hopefully, however,
S. 7 did not intend that an owner's or operator's liability would fluctuate from
day to day, but would remain fixed (unless, of course, his operations changed to
the extent that one of the other three quantities became the basis to calculate
his liability). Thus, to avert a great many problems which could arise (or be
hypothesized) it is suggested that S. 7 should have made reference to the average
or the normal twenty-four hour period. Fortunately, in the 197 o Act, the distinc-
tion between "facilities" and "drilling-production facilities" disappeared, and with
it this troublesome section.
2197o Act § i1(a)(13).
OSenate Hearings, pt. 1, at 133 quoting Letter from Commissioner Joe G.
Moore, Jr., Federal Water Pollution Control Administration, to Mr. Nicoll, Ad-
ministrative Assistant to Senator Muskie, Jan. 23, 1969. Commissioner Moore
stated: "A ton of oil might be somewhat less than 24o gallons or more than 3oo
gallons depending on specific gravity and temperature."
r-S" 7 § 12(a)(i2).
"197o Act § ii(a)(12) (emphasis added).
Regarding the definition of "Act of God" which appeared in S. 7, passed by
the Senate on October 8, 1969, Senator Muskie declared:
The committee ... decided that an owner or operator should be exempt
from liability if he could prove that the discharge was caused solely by
an act of God about which he could have no foreknowledge, could make
no plans to avoid, or could not predict. Under this exception, only dis-
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The definition of "Act of God" in the 197o Act has the effect of
broadening the liability imposed. Pursuant to S. 7, an earthquake
which caused an oil spill from an offshore drilling facility in the
Santa Barbara Channel would most likely absolve the owner or opera-
tor from any liability whatsoever. However, one may argue that under
the 197o Act, such an earthquake could have been anticipated, in view
of the geological configuration of the submerged land in that area.5
If such were the case, the owner or operator might find himself sub-
jected to absolute liability for an oil spill resulting from a natural
force over which he could not possibly have any control.
VI CRITICISM OF THE 197o ACT
A. Requisite Privity and Knowledge of the Owner
One should note that the 197o Act provides that if a discharge were
the result of willful negligence or willful misconduct and all of the
circumstances were "within the privity and the knowledge of the
owner,"57 then the owner or operator would be liable for the full costs
of cleanup. Quaere whether the converse would also be true. If a dis-
charge were the result of such willful negligence or willful misconduct
but was not within the privity and the knowledge of such owner (but
was within the privity and the knowledge of the operator, -then could
it be that neither the owner nor operator would be liable to the
United States Government for the full cleanup costs?
B. Inadequacies in Determining "Harmful Quantities"
With two exceptions, S. 7 prohibited all discharges of oil.58 Excep-
tion (B) provided that certain discharges were "permitted in quanti-
charges resulting from grave natural disasters, which could not be antici-
pated in the design, location or operation of the facility or the vessel in
light of historic, geologic, or climatic circumstances or phenomena, would
be outside the scope of the owner's or operator's responsibility.
115 CONG. REc. 12037 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1969)(emphasis added).
It is interesting to note that this describes the definition of "Act of God" in
the i97o Act and not that which appeared in S. 7, the bill to which Mr. Muskie
was ostensibly referring. Apparently, the definition was changed to conform to
Senator Muskie's view of what it should be.
56See Senate Hearings, pt. S, at 636-38 (testimony of Dr. Robert Curry, Assistant
Professor in the Department of Geography and Environmental Sciences at the
University of California).
5197o Act §§ ii(f)(i)-(3 ), (g) (emphasis added).
sS. 7 § i2(b)(x). Exception (A) concerns discharges into the contiguous zone
under Art. IV of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution
of the Sea by Oil, 1954.
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ties and at times and locations or under such circumstances or condi-
tions as the President may, by regulation, deem appropriate." 59 In con-
trast, the 197o Act prohibits only discharges of oil in harmful quanti-
ties.o0 This Act grants the President the power to determine what con-
stitutes harmful quantities within the following guidelines: "[T]hose
quantities of oil the discharge of which, at such times, locations, cir-
cumstances, and conditions, will be harmful to the public health or
welfare of the United States .... 61 For some unfathomable reason
the drafters of the 197o Act incorporated exception (B) of S. 7, without
change. This exception, produces the following rather curious result:
"The discharge of oil ... in harmful quantities as determined by the
President. . . is prohibited, except... (B) where permitted in quanti-
ties . . . as the President may . . . determine not to be harmful."
0 2
Thus, exception (B) is devoid of meaning and should be stricken as
surplusage from the 197o Act.
It should be reiterated that not all discharges are within the Act.
Since the 197ci Act speaks only to those discharges in harmful quanti-
ties, uncertainty would now exist as to the initial determination
whether any discharge falls within this Act. A "polluter" is within or
without the scope of the Act depending on the (i) times, (2) loca-
tions, (3) circumstances and/or (4) conditions under which the dis-
charge occurred. Given these four criteria, a multitude of standards is
possible since each criterion itself is a variable. It would seem most
difficult, if not impossible, to set a single standard for determining a
harmful quantity. In fact, it is apparently not the purpose of the stat-
ute to set one such uniform standard but to take into consideration the
the four criteria. For this reason, it appears impossible for the Presi-
dent to devise any comprehensive scheme which will afford the oil
shipper and driller adequate notice of what constitutes a harmful
quantity.
It should be kept in mind that exception (B) can only weaken the
legislation since it provides myriad situations in which an oil dis-
charge will not fall within the Act. Also one may question the ra-
tionale in allowing the President to determine what constitutes a dis-
charge of oil in harmful quantities.
rS. 7 § 12(b)(i) (emphasis added).
0sg7o Act § si(b)(2).
a197o Act § n(b)(3) (emphasis added).
"197o Act § i1(b)(2) (emphasis added).
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C. Ambiquity as to Vessel Tonnage
In the 197o Act maximum liability for vessel spillage is "an amount
not to exceed $ioo per gross ton of such vessel or $14,ooo,ooo, which-
ever is lesser ....- 63 Since vessels are classified according to their dead-
weight tonnage and their gross registered tonnage, 64 the 197o Act's
term "gross ton" is ambiguous. However, since H.R. 4148 specified
"gross registered ton," 65 it is probable that the language of the 1970
Act meant gross registered ton.66
D. Degree of Negligence Necessary for the Imposition of
Unlimited Liability
The unlimited liability provison of S. 7 can be compared with that
of the 197o Act. The 197o Act provides that:
where the United States can show that the discharge was the re-
sult of willful negligence or [a] willful [act,] misconduct within
the privity and the knowledge of the owner, [the] such owner or
operator shall be liable to the United States Government for the
full amount of such costs. 67
The italicized portion of the above indicates the language added
to S. 7 while the bracketed words are those omitted from S. 7 in the
197o Act as enacted. It follows that while simple "negligence" or a
"willful act"6 8 on the part of an owner or operator would subject
such owner or operator to unlimited liability under S. 7, the 197o Act
requires that there be "willful negligence" 69 or "willful misconduct."7 0
63197o Act § n (t)() (emphasis added).
"4Senate Hearings, pt. 1, at 184.61H.R 4148 § 17(e)( 0 .
6It also should be noted that S. 7 as introduced, dealt with registered gross
tons. See S. 7 § 12(c)(4) as introduced, Senate Hearings, pt. 1, at 8.
67197o Act §§ 1x(f())-(3), (g).
68BAL ENTINE'S LAW DIcroNARY 1369 (3d ed. 1969) defines Wilful Act as "An
act done intentionally, or on purpose, and not accidentally."
®BLAcs's LAw DiCTIONARY 1186 (4th ed. 1968) defines Willful Negligence:
Though rejected by some courts and writers as involving a contradiction of
terms, this phrase is occasionally used to describe a higher or more
aggravated form of negligence than 'gross.' It then means a willful de-
termination not to perform a known duty, or a reckless disregard of the
safety or the rights of others, as manifested by the conscious and intentional
omission of the care proper under the circumstances.
(emphasis added).
"'BALLENnNE's LAW DICTIONARY 1370 (3d ed. 1969) defines Willful Misconduct
as "The intentional doing, or omitting to do something, either with the knowledge
that such act or omission is likely to result in harm or with a wanton and reckless
disregard of the consequences."
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The net result is that it is more difficult (under the 197o Act) for the
United States to sustain the burden of proof necessary to recover un-
limited damages from the owner or operator. In fact, there appear to
be gradations of negligence from simple negligence (the S. 7 standard)
at the lower end of the spectrum to willful negligence (the 197o Act
standard) at the upper end. Since gross negligence would appear to lie
somewhere between ordinary and willful among the degrees of negli-
gence, the 197o Act could precipitate the rather unconscionable re-
quirement that the federal government pay for a portion of an owner's
or opreator's gross negligence.7 1
E. Inconsistencies of the Third Party Liability Provisions
The 197o Act imposes liability on a "third party" whose acts or
omissions actually caused a discharge. Such an intervention completely
absolves the owner or operator from any liability under the Act 1 2
There are two distinct third party situations. The first occurs when
the third party is the owner or operator of a vessel and the second oc-
curs when he is not:
(i) If such third party was the owner or operator of a vessel
which caused the discharge of oil ... the liability of such
third party ... shall not exceed $1io per gross ton of such
vessel or $14,000,000, whichever is the lesser.73
(2) In any other case the liability of such third party shall not
exceed the limitation which would have been applicable to
the owner or operator of the vessel or the onshore or off-
shore facility from which the discharge actually occurred, if
such owner or operator were liable.74
It should be noted that there are inconsistencies in the third party
situations-an inconsistency within the first and an inconsistency be-
tween the first and the second. Tables B and C deal with these incon-
sistencies respectively.75
In situation Y of Table B, the government will be out of pocket
$21ooo,ooo, while in situation Z, the government will be more than
adequately covered. In fact, if the cost of cleanup exceeds $1o,ooo,ooo
7See note 69 supra.
72197o Act § 11(g).
73197o Act § 11(g).74197o Act § ii(g).
9GIn Tables B and C, the "third party" has caused the damage, relieving the
"owner or operator" from all liability.
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in situation Z, the United States would be able to collect up to $14,-
oooooo since that is the extent of the third party's liability. In situa-
tion Y, the third party would be liable for approximately $22 per ton
of oil spilled, while in situation Z, such third party would be liable for
approximately $i3o per ton of oil spilled. Thus, the amount of costs
recoverable by the United States from a third party vessel is not cor-
related to the costs incurred in cleanup, but to the size of the third
party vessel: the larger the vessel, the higher the limit of liability im-
posed per ton of oil spilled and conversely, the smaller the vessel, the
lower the limit.
It would appear that, under S. 7, the government in situation Y
would have been able to collect $27,ooo,ooo, and in situation Z would
have been able to collect $io,8oo,ooo (in both cases, the actual costs
incurred in cleaning up the spills) . The reason is that in S. 7, the third
party would pay all reasonable cleanup costs, 76 while in the 197o Act,
only the willfully negligent third party would pay the actual cleanup
costs (even though in excess of $ioo per gross ton of the vessel or
$14,000,000, whichever was the lesser)Y.7
Thus, in situation Y, the government would be out of pocket $21,-
ooo,ooo even if the third party had been grossly negligent.1 8 It would
appear that the United States is the insurer, even for a third party's
gross negligence,79 if the government incurs costs in excess of the set
limits.
It should be noted in Table C that the third party vessel has a fixed
liability depending on its gross tonnage (presumably gross registered
tonnage)s 0 A non-vessel third party's liability varies depending upon
whether the innocent party was an offshore facility or a vessel, and if a
vessel, with regard to its size. Thus, for example, should an airplane
be responsible for a collision with a 150,000 grt vessel, resulting in a
spill, it would be liable up to $14,ooo,ooo. A 10,000 grt vessel, respon-
sible for the same collision and spill, would be liable up to only
$i,ooao,ooo. Even though it appears that a vessel is more likely to be
involved in a collision of this nature than an airplane, there still
exists the inherent inconsistency in the Act, resulting from the dichoto-
mous categorization of third parties.
"See generally S. 7 §§ 12(j)(1)-(2).
7i97o Act § ii(g).
nSee text accompanying notes 67-71 supra.
7OSee note 69 supra.
B'See 197o Act § 11(g).
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E. Lack of Correlation Between Costs Incurred and Costs Recoverable
Assuming the 197o Act's "gross ton" means "gross registered ton,"
perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the 197o Act is the method of
determining liability to be imposed for cleanup costs. It would appear
that the most desirable way of calculating liability is by determining
the quantity of oil released to the environment and multiplying this
by an average cost per gallon or ton which is required for such clean-
up.81 Actual cleanup costs have varied from less than $z.oo to over
$5.00 per gallon, depending on various circumstances. 8 2 In the Torrey
Canyon spill the true cost of cleanup per gallon of oil released ap-
proached $-.7o per gallon.8 3
The Senate and the House originally set limits of liability high
enough to enable the government to recover fully the cost of cleaning
up oil spills by correlating the cost of cleanup per gallon of oil re-
leased to the environment to the gross registered tonnage of the vessel
involved.8 4 The cleanup costs were calculated at $450.00 per gross regi-
stered ton using the figure of $i.oo per gallon.85 However, the 197o Act
limits liability to Sioo per gross ton, thus setting the cleanup cost at
$.22 per gallon, 6 a totally unrealistic figure in light of the Torrey
Canyon disaster. Since the Torrey Canyon was approximately 6o,ooo
grt8 7 and io8,ooo d.w.t.88 and spilled all its cargo, the total cleanup
61See Senate Hearings, pt. i, at 133.
"2Senate Hearings, pt. i, at 133.
"Senate Hearings, pt. 1, at 133.
"See S. 7 § 12(c)(4), as introduced, Senate Hearings, pt. i, at 8; H.R. 4148
§ 12(e)(1) as introduced, House Hearings at 3o.
"Senate Hearings, pt. i, at 133-34 quoting Letter from Commissioner Joe G.
Moore, Jr., Federal Water Pollution Control Administration, to Mr. Nicoll, Ad-
ministive Assistant to Senator Muskie, Jan. 23, 1969. In discussing cleanup cost
calculations, Commissioner Moore stated:
Relating the cost per gallon of oil released to the environment to the
gross registered tonnage of a vessel is not a clear cut calculation. A ton of
oil might be somewhat less than 240 gallons or more than 3oo gallons
depending on specifice gravity and temperature. The ratio between the
actual cargo carrying capability and the gross registered tonnage of a
tanker is non-uniform, varying with tanker size, tanker design and specific
gravity of the cargo being carried. An average of several differing sizes of
tankers indicates that the ratio between cargo carrying capacity and gross
registered tonnage may be in the ratio of 2.7 to 1.5 (or 1.8:1). Using those
approximations (25 o gal/ton and cargo tonnage/grt of 2.7:1.5) the $450
per gross registered ton is equivalent to Si.oo per gallon (250 x 2.7/1.5 x
S.oo equals $456).
"See 197o Act §§ i(f)(),(g). Using the formula, 250 x 2.7/1.5 x X equals
Soo, X equals $.22.
61Torrey Canyon's gross registered tonnage (grt) is given as 59,5oo. See Senate
Hearings, pt. l, at 184.
"SThe ratio of a ship's d.w.t. to its grt is approximately i.8:i. See Senate Hear-
ings, pt. i, at 133.
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costs were approximately $20,00,000 (calculated on the basis of $.7o
per gallon of oil released). However, in the absence of either willful
negligence or willful misconduct, the owner or operator of the Torrey
Canyon, under the 197o Act, would have been liable for only $6,ooo,ooo
of those costs.8 9
It is possible to illustrate the same shortcomings of the 197o Act
in another way, by the use of a "breakpoint" factor. 90 In the House
and Senate bills, as introduced, this factor was approximately 33,500
grt. In other words, vessels this large or larger would be liable up to
the maximum liability of $15,000,000, while those less than 33,500' grt
would be liable at the rate of $450 per gross registered ton.91 However,
in the 197o Act, the breakpoint factor is 140,000 grt. 92 Therefore, under
the enacted legislation, it is only vessels of the supertanker size which
will be liable up to the maximum of $14,00o,00o.93 Thus, under S. 7
and H.R. 4148, as introduced, the Torrey Canyon (its 6o,ooo grt being
above the breakpoint factor of 33,500) would have been subjected to
the maximum liability imposable under those bills. However, a vessel
the size of the Torrey Canyon would not even approach the breakpoint
factor of the 197o Act and therefore would be liable only at the hope-
lessly inadequate rate of $ioo per gross ton of such vessel. 94
Quaere why a statute which ostensibly was enacted to provide
means whereby the United States could dean up and be reimbursed
m$ioo/gross ton x 6o,ooo gross tons. See 197o Act § ii(f)(i).
90For vessels, the "breakpoint" factor is determined by dividing the maximum
limited liability by the liability imposed per gross ton:
(i) for S. 7 and H.R. 4148, as introduced,
$15,ooo,ooo/$45o/grt equals 33,333 grt
(2) for 197o Act,
S14,ooo,ooo/$io/grt equals 140,000
O'See H.R. 4148 § i2(e)(i), as introduced, House Hearings at 30; S. 7 §
12(c)(4), as introduced, Senate Herings, pt. i, at 8.
aA vessel of 14oooo grt would have a deadweight tonnage of approximately
252,000. It would appear that as of June, 1969, there were only nine tankers in
operation that would be subjected to the maximum liability of $14,ooo,ooo under
the 197o Act. Note 8 supra. However, the average deadweight tonnage of these
vessels was 802,666, and the average cost of cleanup for a spill from one of them
(calculated at $.7o per gallon-the cost in the Torrey Canyon spill and 250 gallons
per ton) would be almost $53,000,000.
However, it is truly astounding that even using the cleanup cost figure of
$.22 per gallon of oil spilled-which would appear to be less than one third the
actual cost-the limits set by the i97o Act are still inadequate to cover the cost
of the average spill of these tankers.
Cost of cleaup: 3o2,666 tons (of oil) X 250 gal/ton x $22/gal equals
$16,646,63o.
Maximum liability: $14,000,000.
"See note 92 supra.
9See 197o Act § s(f))
1970] STATUTORY COMMENTS 299
therefore, should impose liability of $6,ocfo,ooo for a spill when, in fact,
it was known that cleanup from a spill of such magnitude would cost
three times that amount.
VII CONCLUSION
Although there are imperfections in the Water Quality Improve-
ment Act of 1970, its provisions fill a void left by the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act. The drafters of the prior act remained totally
oblivious to the problems which the 197o Act attempts to solve. Thus,
while the Water Quality Improvement Act of 197o has its inconsistent
and weak provisions, hopefully these will be amended. For the present,
the 197o Act poses at least a partial solution to a pressing problem.
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